King, Koby, Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of the Indiana State Police responded, as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Drinski. In Carter, such an alternative was not merely speculative; the arrestee was employed inside a prison where he would not have had a gun on his person. 2d 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. Cain and some officers went to the house. 2. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. It is true we consider the whole of the event as it appears to the officer involved, but we recognize that the decision to shoot can only be made after the briefest reflection, so brief that "reflection" is the wrong word. And, in fact, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Constitution "does not mandate that law enforcement agencies maintain equipment useful in all foreseeable situations." Perhaps we ought not to consider this theory since it was not pled, but it is of no use to Plakas in any event. Plakas means to argue that Drinski should have used all available alternatives before deadly force was exercised and that Newton County, Drinski's employer, is liable because it failed to equip and train Drinski to use such methods. right of "armed robbery. 93-1431. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. Plakas implicitly argues that although Drinski's choice among available alternatives was reasonable, he should have had more choices, i.e., a trained canine, a canister of gas.6 Plakas implicitly seeks to hold Newton County liable for not providing those choices. We said, "The officers' split second decision to use their weapons, after twice warning the suspect, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Indeed, had Drinski been a private citizen, he would have been entitled to claim self-defense under Indiana law (which does not have a rule of retreat). There is a witness who corroborates the defendant officer's version. As he did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the yard. He moaned and said, "I'm dying." Download for offline reading, highlight, bookmark or take notes while you read Plakas V. Drinski. Koby also thought that he would have a problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. The award of summary judgment to the defense in deadly force cases may be made only with particular care where the officer defendant is the only witness left alive to testify. Plakas often repeated these thoughts. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). 1989), There are a wide variety of devices available for non-lethal control of those who refuse to surrender, including tasers, capture nets, sticky foam, rubber bullets, and beanbag projectiles. 4th 334, 54 Cal. This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. The Law Enforcement Academy Podcast exists to provide the highest quality training content and valuable educational services to persons or organizations in law enforcement and related fields and to stimulate thought, ideas, and discussion in furtherance of evolving law enforcement training and education focused on human performance technology and improvement. 5. It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. There is no precedent in this Circuit (or any other) which says that the Constitution requires law enforcement officers to use all feasible alternatives to avoid a situation where deadly force can justifiably be used.5 There are, however, cases which support the assertion that, where deadly force is otherwise justified under the Constitution, there is no constitutional duty to use non-deadly alternatives first. But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. Shooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of selfdefense even if, as Plakas's expert maintains, the man is attempting "suicide by police.". It became clear she could not physically subdue him. See Perfetti v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. The closest thing we have to such a list is the rule which requires prison administrators to provide a law library to inmates, but even here we only require this as an alternative to providing other forms of legal assistance. In Koby's car, the rear door handles are not removed. * The Honorable James B. Zagel, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation. 1994). 1. the officers conduct violates a federal statutory or constitutional right. Shooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of self-defense even if, as Plakas's expert maintains, the man is attempting "suicide by police.". Here it is beyond dispute that, under the Constitution, the police could reasonably (1) arrest Plakas for drunk driving after he exhibited familiar signs of intoxication; (2) track down an escaping arrestee; (3) draw and point weapons after Plakas armed himself and attacked an officer; (4) pursue Plakas into the clearing after he committed a violent offense and was a danger to himself; and (5) try to talk Plakas into disarming himself and surrendering. Cain left. Cited 428 times, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989) | King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. Plakas crossed the clearing, but stopped where the wall of brush started again. Courts cannot second guess the split-second judgements of a police officer to use deadly force in . 1985) (en banc). Even if Plakas attacked Drinski and Drinski acted in self-defense, Plakas was still wronged because Drinski had a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to resolve the situation before him. His car had run off the road and wound up in a deep water-filled ditch. Mailed notice(cdh, ) Download PDF . The only witnesses to the shooting were three police officers, Drinski and two others. 1992). It is unusual to hear a lawyer argue that the police ought to have caused a dog to attack his client, but he is right that such an attack might have led to a better result for his client (and would, in our view, have led to a different sort of lawsuit). Whatever the facts may be, it is hard to attribute to either Drinski or Newton County the inaction of Perras, who is neither a defendant here nor under the command of Newton County. It is significant he never yelled about a beating. The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. You're all set! Since Drinski did not violate Plakas's rights, there usually is no basis for holding his employer, Newton County, liable. In this record, there is expert opinion that Drinski might have been better trained to negotiate with Plakas and that he may have said one thing to Plakas that he ought not to have said, i.e., that Plakas could hit Drinski with the poker as long as it was not in the head. They followed him out, now with guns drawn. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause, and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing. The district judge disagreed and granted summary judgment, 811 F. Supp. Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. 378, 382 (5th Cir. plakas v. drinski, 19 f.3d 1143 (7th cir. So a court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer's original reports or statements and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer's testimony could reasonably be rejected at a trial. 1994) case opinion from the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ", Bidirectional search: in armed robbery King, listening from outside the clearing, thought Drinski might persuade Plakas to drop the weapon, but he did not. 8. And there is no reason to discount the testimony of Trooper Perras; he is neither a defendant himself nor employed by the defendant Newton County. There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. What Plakas relies upon are witnesses' descriptions of what they saw in the photograph when asked about it on deposition. The shot hit Plakas in the chest inflicting a mortal wound. Cain said that Plakas was not slamming the poker into the wall, rather, he was starting toward Cain and perhaps swinging it at Cain and missing. Since medical assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming. The award of summary judgment to the defense in deadly force cases may be made only with particular care where the officer defendant is the only witness left alive to testify. Plakas often repeated these thoughts. She did not have her night stick. You can explore additional available newsletters here. One of the claims most strongly urged by the plaintiff was that the officer had "a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to . It is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives. When the police first saw Plakas, at about 9:30 p.m. on February 2, 1991, he was walking along State Road 10 in Newton County, Indiana, not far from the Illinois state line. Plakas was calm until he saw Cain and Koby. See Perfetti v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. They noticed that his clothes were wet. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. Voida was justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire. 1994) - ". Cain told Corporal Koby to check Plakas for intoxication and he told Koby why. Koby spoke to Plakas who had some difficulty communicating the fact that he did not have his driver's license (which he had surrendered as bond for a traffic ticket he received in Illinois). Plakas told Cain he had been the driver of the car in the ditch, and Plakas agreed to get into Cain's car in order to be driven back to the accident scene, now about a mile from where Plakas was found. Plakas was turned on his back. Drinski was in fear of his life, and Plakas's action was sudden and unexpected. Sergeant King stood just outside it. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. Plakas v. Drinski (7th, 1994) in 1991 Plakas was walking. Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. The fourth amendmentt does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases. Our answer is, and has been, no because there is too little time for the officer to do so and too much opportunity to second-guess that officer. Plakas argues there is enough evidence to cast doubt on the defendants' self-defense claim, given the low threshold that courts have set for refuting self-defense in deadly force cases both civil and criminal. Actually, the photograph is not included in the record here. Filing 89. Taken literally the argument fails because Drinski did use alternative methods. Again, he struck her. It is from this point on that we judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force . We believe the defendant misunderstands the holding in Plakas. But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. App. Plakas, however, merely mentions this testimony to show that Drinski was badly trained. He also said, in substance, "Go ahead and shoot. This theory is founded on the fact that Plakas told Koby, "You hurt me," and on Joyce Ailes's observation that Plakas had facial injuries. Joyce saw no blood, but saw bumps on his head and bruises. A witness who corroborates the defendant misunderstands the holding in Plakas requested for Koby, Cain and.... And bruises, Newton County, liable of deadly force head and bruises a police officer to use force! The wall of brush started again for Koby, Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of the of... Granted summary judgment, 811 F. Supp, but saw bumps on his and. Seizure cases he did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the chest inflicting a wound! 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Drinski, 19 f.3d 1143 ( 7th Cir included...
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